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lf##.i was charged in a Tampa 01unicipal ct with driving while

under the influence of alcohol.

~
~

He moved before trial to quash

4....c..

the arrest warrant issued against him on the ground that it was

~~

~t approved by a neutral and detac8:~i:~gistr~e as reguired by~
the 4th Amendment.

The motion was ~ffi### and appellant sought ~
The.case was heard both by the L~

review in the Florida app cts.

Dist Ct App and, subsequently, by the Florida SC,

re~ted

~ Flo~ ida
~t

appellant's claims.

Those cts

The core of his charge is that

statutes1 which permit arrest warrants to be signed by

clerks of municipal

~ourts 1 are

unconstitutional,

~

~~

~

He argues that

many cases decided by this Court have referred to the process of
su~mission

of affidavits to detached «judicial offiers'' for

determination of probable cause.

The clerks are not judicial

officers and, therefore, appellant says the statutes are unconstitutional.

~

Neither party cites this Court's most recent decision in
this area,

Last Term, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, No. 323,

(6/21/71), this Court held that a search and arrest warrant
signed by the State Attorney General was not valid under the 4th
Amendment because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached
magistrate."

The Ct emphasized that the Attorney General

was directly involved in the investigation and,

---------

therefor~

was too closely tied up in the "often competitive enterprise of

-

ferretiing out crime." The opinion also cites the long line of
......____ '-'
cases in this court saying that warrants must be issued "by a

/

judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent."
I think the question raised is an important one.

The 4th
~

Amendment itself says nothing about what type of public official
must pass on the warrant, it merely
states that "no warrants
.....______
shall issue but upon probable cause • • • "

This Court's

opinionsindicate that the dominant factor in determining who
/1 (

,,

may issue the warrant is that he be neutral and detached--that
he not be a part of the la w enforcement team.

There is a sub-

interest mintioned in some cases which indicates that judicial
officers have the experience and peculiar ability to weight
evidence to determine that it meets the legal standard of probable cause.

I think this latter concern is secondary to what

appears to lie at the heart of the warrant requirement.

The

right to be free from unjustified governmental interference is
protected by imposing between the citizen and the zealous police
official an

im~ l

"~"

who can weight, without a

fixed pred1sposition to find probable cause, the sufficiency
of the warrant.

--:---_____.,

I think the issue is made more important by the growing

tendency to utilize, within the judicial process, para-judicial
p~onnel

to handle a greater percentage of tne routine functions_/

of our local judges .

Whether this is a function which can be

performed by non-judicial or para-judicial persons , I think,
depends on their ability to comprehend the issues they are
forced to consider and their ability to remain outside the mainstream of law enforcement.
I must note, too, that if your inclination is to hold that
clerks of coutts may perform this function, this case may be a
poor vehicle for reaching that result.

The affidavit of the

police officer on which the arrest warrant was pemised is
drafted in conclusory, "form" terms.

The stat.ute does not say

anything about judges (here clerks) making a probable cause
determination (the florida SC rules that a requirement that they
make a finding of probable cause may be inferred although the
statute in question imposes no such rule) .
~auld

be a

Q~ticula£ly_poor

example of

This case , therefore ,

we.l/
how para-jueicial
A

types can do the job .
On balance, unless you are firmly persuaded that clerks of
courts may

[l~t

act as "neutral and detached magistrates; • I

recommend that you vote to dismiss .
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BENCH MEMO
No. 71-5445 SHADWICK v. TAMPA
The charter of the City of Tampa - granted by Florida legislature authorizes the City Clerk to issue arrest warrants, which are issued by
the Clerk without any express authority "to determine the question of
probable cause. "
In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida held:

"The Clerk and Deputy Clerks of the Municipal Court
of the City of Tampa are neutral and detached 1 magistrates 1 ,
unconnected with law enforcement, for the purpose of
issuing arrest warrants within the requirements of the
United States Constitution, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Florida Constitution.
"
The appellant states:
"This appeal presents to this court for the first time
the question_of whether} he independent judgment that
probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant
required under the Fourth and Fifteenth Amendments ~
IJ rna be ade hv a non"udicial officer and specifically
~ whether it may be made by a Clerk of ourt. "
J

The Clerk of the Court is authorized by Florida law to issue a
warrant upon an affidavit submitted by a police officer.

The affidavit

2.
by a police officer and the warrant by the City Clerk - involving a traffic
violation - are

d

se~

on pp. 4 and 5 of the Appendix.

rubber stamp was used to describe the offense.

They show that a

There is no express finding

o f probable cause.
The Clerk's authority relates only to the Municipal Courts of Tampa.
I do not believe the record shows what the Florida practice is in the courts
that try felonies.
Neither brief is particularly good.

The brief filed on behalf of Tampa

by my friend and Rhodes scholar, William Reece Smith, Jr., is a disgrace.
It is signed - and obviously was written - by the Assistant City Attorney.
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SHADWICK v. TAMPA 71-5445
Argued 4/10/72
Tentative Impressions*
The sole question is validity of provision of Tampa charter
(approved by legislature) which authorizes "the judge or clerk of the
municipal court" to issue warrants for arrests on the basis of affidavits
submitted by the police.

The charter further expressly empowers

deputy clerks to do likewise.
Although the statute does not contain any express requirement
of a finding of "probable cause", counsel for both sides conceded that
the statute has been so interpreted by the Florida court.
Jurisdictional Question:
Justice Blackmun - joined by others - questioned whether the
case was "ripe" for this Court. The appellant was not convicted - indeed
he was not tried. Although this purports to be a common law writ of
certiorari, it is more like a request for a declaratory judgment.
I will follow a majority of the Court on the jurisdiction question.
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read,
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion
at the Conference.

2.
Decision on Merits:
If we reach the merits, I am inclined to vote to affirm.

The Fourth Amendment does not specify who shall issue warrants,
although this Court has held that a "magistrate " must be "a neutral
and detached magistrate" rather than "an officer engaged" in law
enforcement. The test seems to be "neutrality and detachment" - not
whether one is a judge, a lawyer or a layman.
In this case, the clerk, a civil servant, appointed by the Mayor

(or a deputy clerk appointed by the clerk with the approval of the Mayor)
is in the "judicial department of the City of

Tamp~

and is said by

counsel to be an "officer of the Court" (Tampa's brief p. 16).
There is no
showing in the record of partiality, and-c:::::no s_howing
..____--=
of affiliation with police.
In addition, considerations of federalism would justify sustaining

the Florida statute under the circumstances in this case.
While a lawyer or a judicial officer may be desirable in the
role of magistrate, there is no reason why the state should not be
allowed to use laym ~n or other officials so long as they are neutral
and detached.

~
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No. 71-5445

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Til
Mr. Covert E. Parnell, III

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

June 2, 1972

Shadwick
I am delivering the Shadwick draft to Pete this morning.

I think

it is ready for the printer, but want Pete to look at it first.
Pete can then request the printer to deliver four copies during
the day on Saturday, if possible, so that Jay will be able to review it.
We can circulate on Monday.
L.F.P. , Jr.

.:§u:prm:t <q!tu.d 4lf tqt ~ttitt~ .:§tatts
~aslrhtgfutt.

IB. <q.

2llbl~~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 9, 1972

Re: No. 71-5445 - Shadwick v. City of Tampa

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your opinion.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss 2cc 6/18/72
Shadwick v. City of Tampa
This case, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida,
involves a narrow but important issue.
An ordinance of the City of Tampa/authorizes the issuance

of arrest warrant,by clerks of the municipal court. The sole
questimfis whether these clerks qualiffas neutral and detached
magistrates/for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We hold

-

that they do.
We reject the argument 8f }iQtiti8ner that the Fourth

-

Amendment requires that these warrants be issued only by
judicial officers - i.e., lawyers or judges, specially designated
for the purposes.

-

The constitutional testfos whether the person exercising

the warrant

authorit~!2 ~t ~ neutral and detached

official,/

independent of the police and the prosecution.
We hold that the clerks in the Tampa Municipal Court
meet this test. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the Florida
Supreme Court.

*****
Unanious opinion of the Court.

July 20, 1972

Re:

No. 71-5445 Shadwick v. Tampa

Dear Mr. Putzel:
Thank you again for your suggested editorial changes.
All are agreeable, save the following:
On page 2 - please omit the comma after "driving" .
On page 4 - retain "that of".
On page 7 - retain "that".
to "those" .

Please do not change

On page 8 - As to the book in footnote 11, do not
worry. I have a personal copy, and it is catalogued
in the Supreme Court Library.
On page 9 - retain " innovativeness " .
On page 9 - please revise to read "as to whom they
entrust the authority" .
All other changes are fine, and I do appreciate both
your suggestions and the consistent thoroughness with which
your checks are conducted.
Sincerely,

Mr. Henry Putzel, jr.
lfp/ss
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Shadwick

FOOTNOTES

1. The relevant Florida statutes and Tampa charter
provisions are as follows:
1. Florida Statute (1967) Section 168.04, F.S.A.,
which reads as follows:

CLERK AND MARSHALL MAY TAKE
AFFIDAVITS AND ISSUE WARRANTS

J

The. clerk may administer an oath to and take affidavit of any person charging another with an offense by breach of an ordinance, and may issue a
warrant to the marshall to have the accused person
arrested and brought before the mayor for trial
The marshall may, in the absence of the mayor and
cle~k f~om the police station, administer oaths to
affidavits of complaints and issue warrants for the
arrest of persons complained against.
2. Section 495 of the Charter of the City of Tampa
enacted by the legislature of the State of Florida in
Section 17, Chapter 5363, Laws of Florida, 1903, which
reads as follows:
The Chief of Police, or any policeman of the City
of Tampa may arrest, without warrant, any person
violating any of the ordinances of said city, committed in the presence of such officer, and when
knowledge of the violation of any ordinance of said
city shall come to said chief of police or policeman,
not committed in his presence, he shall at once make
affidavit, before the judge or clerk of the municipal
court, against the person charged with such violation, whereupon said judge or cl€rk shall issue
a warrant for the 'a rrest of such person.
3. Section 160 . .. of the Charter of the City of
Tampa enacted by the legislature of the State 'Of Florida
in Section 1, Chapter 61-2915, Laws of Florida, 1961,
which reads as follows: ...
The city clerk of the City of Tampa, with the approval of the mayor, may appoint one or more
deputies, such deputy or deputies to be selected
from the approved classified list of the city civil
service, and to have and exercise the same powers
as the city clerk himself, including but not limited
to the issuance of warrants. One or more of such
deputies may be designated as clerks of the municipal court.

2.
2.

Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 6, 7, 20, 21.

3.

Appellant's Brief p. 6; Transcript of Oral Argument,

4.

Appellant's Brief p. 12-13; Reply Brief p. 8.

5.

Reply Brief p. 8; Transcript of Oral Argument,

p. 10.

p. 10-12.
6.

The U. S. Commissioner system has, of course,

been replaced by the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
1107.
7. Webster's Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1957, defines
magistrate as "a person clothed with power as a public civil
officer; a public civil officer invested with executive or
judicial powers, . . . " or, more narrowly, "a magistrate of
a class having summary, often criminal, jurisdiction, as a
justice of the peace, or one of certain officials having a
similar jurisdiction; . . . "

Random House Dictionary (1966)

defines magistrate as (1) "a civil officer charged with the

3.
administration of the law" and (2) a minor judicial officer,
as a justice of the peace, or police justice, having jurisdiction
to try minor criminal cases and to conduct preliminary
examinations of persons charged with serious crimes. "
8.

U.S. Commissioners were not required to be lawyers

until passage of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968. Even under
this act, a limited exception to lawyers status is afforded
part-time magistrates.
9.
10.

28 U.S. C. 631 (b)(1).

Transcript of Oral Argument p. 10.
The Federal

~Magistrates

Act explicitly

makes provision for non-lawyers to be appointed in those
communities where members of the bar are not available.
28

u.s. c.

631 (b)(1).

11. See, generally, C. Whitebread ed., Mass Production
Justice and the Constitutional Ideal (1970).
12. states differ significantly in whom they entrust
authority to grant a warrant. See

4.
T~vai'imis-legak:-can cepts-...contained-in-t>c~o
.~n

I

follow.ed..i.ZJ.. .f.ourteen-states. Burke v. Superior
Court} 3 Ariz. App. 576, 416 P. 2d 997, 1000 (Ct. App.
Ariz. 1966); Parks v. Superior Court) 236 P.2d 874, 882
(1st D.C.A. Calif. 1951); Kennedy v. Walker) 135 Conn.
262, 63 A.2d 589, 594 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1948) ;~hadwick
v. City of Tampa) 250 So. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1971) ; State
v. Swafford) 250 Ind. 541, 237 N.E. 2d 580, 584 (Sup.
67C<-}?"

i/.
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No. 71-5445 Shadwick v. City of Tampa
The charter of Tampa, Florida authorizes the issuance
of certain arrest warrants by clerks of the Tampa Municipal
Court.

1

The sole question in this case is whether these clerks

qualify as neutral and detached magistrates for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. We hold that they do.
Appellant was

~

arrested for impaired driving

on a warrant issued by a clerk of the Municipal Court. He
moved the court to quash the warrant as issued by a non-judicial
officer in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth .Amendments.
When the motion was denied, he initiated proceedings through
the Florida courts by means of that state's Wright of Common
Law Certiorari. The state proceedings culminated in the holding
of the Florida Supreme Court that "the clerk and deputy clerks
of the municipal court of the city of Tampa are neutral and
lblbndetached magistrates . . . for the purpose of issuing

2.
arrest warrants within the requirements of the United States
•'

Constitution. . . . " 250 So. 2d 4, 5 (1971). We granted
certiorari,

- - u.s.

(197 ).

A brief description of the clerk's position is necessary.

He is p appointed by the City Clerk from a classified list of civil
\

servants, and assigned to work in the 1\.funicipal Court. The
statute does not specify what qualifications are necessary for this

..

\'

job, but no law degree or intensive legal training is required.
The clerk's duties are to receive traffic fines, prepare the court's
dockets and records, fill out commitment papers and perform
other routine clerical tasks. Apparently he may issue subpoenas.
He may not, however, sit as a judge, and he may not issue a
search warrant or even a felony or misdemeanor arrest warrant.
In fact, the only warrant he may grant is for the arrest of

2

those who have breached munic ipal ordinances.

I

3.
Appellant contends that even this limited warrant authority

~···
,,

of the clerk breaches an alleged Fourth Amendment requirement
that issuing magistrates be exclusively "judicial officers. " He
contends further that warrant applications of whatever nature
cannot be assured the discerning, independent review compelled
by the .Fourth .Amendment when the review is performed by less
3

than a judicial officer.

It is less than clear, however, as to who

may qualify as a "judicial officer." To some, this term may
implya only a lawyer or judge. There is some suggestion in
appellant's brief that a judicial officer might profitably be a
4

lawyer or the municipal court judge himself.

A more complete

portrayal of appellant's position would be that the Tampa clerks
are disqualified as judicial officers not merely because they are
not lawyers or judges, but because ib;c they lack the institutional
independence associated with the judiciary in that they are
members of the civil service, appointed by the city clerk, "an

t l

4.
executive official, " and enjoy no

~

statutorily specified
,.

5

tenure a in office.
Past decisions of the Court have admittedly mentioned
review by a "judicial officer'' prior to issuance of a warrant
~itley

v. Warden, 401 U. s. 560, 564 (1971); Katz v. United

states, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 481-2 (1963); Jones v. United states, 362 U.S.
257, 270 (1960); Johnson v. United states, 333 U.s. 10, 14 (1948)
In some cases the term, "judicial officer" appears to have

been used interchangeably with that of "magistrate." Katz v.
United states! and .Johnson v. United states, supra. In others
it was intended simply to underscore the now accepted fact that

someone independent of the police and prosecution must determine
probable cause. 1lldm
~ted Stat~

Jone~

v. United States 1 :aa.r.a supra; Wong Sun v.

supra. The very term "judicial officer" implies,

of course, some connection with the judicial branch. But it has

5.
But it has never suggested that only a lawyer or judge could
grant a warrant, regardless of the court system involved or the
type of warrant to be sought. In Jones,supra, 270-271, the
Court implied that U. S. Commissioners, many of whom were
not lawyers or judges, were nonetheless "independent judicial
6

officers. "
The Court has also frequently employed the term "magistrate"

I

I

to denote those who may issue warrants, Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.s. 443, 449-5:t(1971); Whitley v. Warden, supra, at 56~.

'

Katz v. United states, supra, at 356-7; United states v. Ventreca,
380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); Giondenello v. United states, 357 U.s.
480, 486 (1958); Johnson v. United states, supra, at 13-14;
-

United states v. Lefhowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). Historically
a magistrate has been broadly defined as "a plmda public civil
officer, possessing such power, legislative, executive or judicial,
as the government appointing him may ordain, " Compton v.

6.
Alabam!t 214 U.S. 1, 7 (1909), or, in a narrower sense "an
l'

inferior judicial officer, such as a justice of the peace. " Id.
7
More recent definitions have not much changed.

In Compton, a

notary public was deemed a magistrate under fkle Georgia law
and hence for the purposes of federal fugitive from justice statutes.
The Court has nowhere indicated, however, that magistrate means
solely a lawyer or judge.
An examination of the Court's decisions thus reveals the

terms "magistrate" and "judicial officer" to have been interchangeable. Little attempt was made to define either term, to
distinguish the one from the other, or to advance one as the
difinitive Fourth Amendment requiremenbs. We find no commandment in either term, however, that all warrant authority must
'

reside exclusively in a lawyer or judge. Such a requirement would
have been incongruous when even within the federal system, warrants
8

were until recently widely issued by non-lawyers.

7.
To attempt to extract further significance from the above
terminology would be both divesting and elusive. The substance
of the Court's warrant concerns does not turn on the labelling
of the issuing party. The warrant has traditionally represented
an independent assurance that a search and arrest will not proceed
without cause. Thus an issuing magistrate must meet two tests.
He must be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of
determining Jl1iJm: whether probable cause exists for the requested
arrest or search. This Court has long insisted that probable
cause be drawn by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States,
!~~

at 13-14; Giondenello v. United States,

SliD

supra, at

486. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, the Court last term
voided a search warrant issued by the state Attorney General
"who was actively in charge of the investigation and later was

\
\

\

\

8.

to be chief prosecutor at trial. " Id. at 450. If, on the other hand,
detachment and capacity do conjoin, the magistrate has satisfied
the Fourth Amendment's purpose.
The requisite detachment is present in the case at hand.
Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear
that it requires severance and disengagement from activities of
law enforcement. There has been no showing whatever here of
paritiality or affiliation of these clerks with prosecutors or police.
The record shows no disqualifying connection with any law
enforcement activity or authority which would distort the
independent judgment the Fourth Amendment requires. Appellant
9

himself expressly refused to allege anythign to that effect.
A primary responsibility of the clerk, far from being to the

J1ik police or prosecutor, is instead to the Municipal Court judge
to whom he is assigned and for whom he works. In this sense,
he may well be termed a judicial officer. While a statutorily

..

9.

specified term of office and appointment by someone other than
"an executive authority" might be desirable, the absence of such
fe tures is hardly disqualifying. Judges themselves take office
under differing and less than independent circumstances. Some
are elected, but most are appointed by executive authority.
Many enjoy but limited terms and are subject to executive
reappointment. Most depend for their salary level upon the
legislative branch. This Court refuses, therefore, to vault
requirements for the independence of a municipal clerk to a
hypocritically high level. His neutrality is clear enough: he
is removed from prosecutor or police and works within the
judicial branch subject to the supervision of the Municipal
court judge.
Appellant has likewise failed to demonstrate that these
clerks lack capacity to determine probable cause. The clerk's
authority extends only to the issuance of arrest warrants for

10.
breach of municipal ordinances. We presume from the nature of
the clerk's position that he would be able to deduce from the
facts on an affidavit before him whether there was probable cause
to believe a citizen quilty of & impaired driving, breach of peace,
drunkenness, trespass or the multiple other common offenses
covered by a municipal code. There has been no showing that
this is too complex an endeavor for a clerk to accomplish. Our
legal system has long entrusted non-lawyers to evaluate more
complex and significant factual data than that in the case at hand.
Grand juries daily determine probable cause prior to indictments,
and trial juries assess whether guilt is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. The significanee and responsibility of these lay judgments
betrays any belief that the Tampa clerks could net determine
proble cause for arrest.
We decide tcxiay only that clerks of the Municipal Court
may constitutionally grant the warrants in question. We have

11.

,.

"

not considered whether the actual issuance followed a sufficient
determination of probable cause. The affidavit in this case may
have been so bare and conclusory in its terms as to invalidate
the issuance of any warrant based upon it. Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964). Appellant, however, did not submit this
question to the courts below, 237 So. 2d 231 (19 ), 250 So. 2d
4 (1971), and we will not decide it here initially. The single

·'

question thus remains whether power has been lawfull vested,
not whether it has been constitutionally exercised. V\B

.

We also do not imply that the state may lodge warrant

..

authority in anyone outside the sphere of law enforcement.

..

Many persons may not qualify as the kind of "public civil officers"
we have come to associate with the term "magistrate. " We

'·'

recognize also that we have not resolved fully the question of \
whether and to what degree issuing magistrates must be
institutionally responsible to the judicial department of the

'

\

\

12.
city or state in which they work. Had the clerk been more
divorced from a judicial position, this case might be a different
one. Here, however, the clerk is a functioning part of the judicial
branch of the city of Tampa,

~

disassociated from the

affairs of law enforcement, and the independent nature of his
position is fully satisfied.
What we do reject today is any per se invalidation of
a state or local warrant system on the sole grounds that the
issuing magistrate is not a lawyer or judge. This Court will
not lightly fasten on

every~

unit of state and local govern-

ment requirements potentially inimical to their individuals needs
and interests. Many communities may have a shortage of lawyers
or judges and need to delegate the responsibility of issuing warrants
10

to other available and competent personnel.

Many municipal
11

courts, moreover, face stiff and unrelenting caseloads,

and

a judge pressured with the docket before him, may give warrant

'

13.
applications more brisk and summary treatment than would a
clerk. All this is not to imply that)j a judge or lawyer would not
ideally provide the most desirable review for warrant requests.
But our federal system warns of converting desirable practice
into constitutional commandment. Rather it recognizes in plural

12
and diverse state activity/one key to national innovativeness
and vitality. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the
Judicial F\mcti<?!!_ in

Bal~nce,

49 A. B. A. J. 943, 944 (1963).

States are entitled irlosomJix to some flexibility and leeway in their
designation of ~ magistrates, so long as all are neutral
and detached and capable of the probable cause determination
required of them.
The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is Affirmed.

'
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The charter of Tampa, Florida, authorizes the issuance
of certain arrest warrants by clerks of the Tampa Municipal Court. 1 The sole question in this case is whether
The relen111t Floridrt stn.tutes nnd Tnmpn rhnrter pro1·i~ions
arr n~ follows:
"1. Floridn, Stntute (19G7) Section 168.04, F. S. A., \\·h ich rr:1ds
ns follows:
1

"CLERK AND MAHRHALL l\IAY TAKE
AFFIDAVITS AND ISSUE WARRANTS
"The clerk mny administer nn onth to nnd take affidavit of any
prrson chnr!J;ing nnolhrr with nn offrnsr by brrneh of nn ordinnnce,
and mny issue a wnrrant to the mnrshnll to hrtYc thr nccusec! prrson
arrested nnd brought before the mn~·or for trial. The marshall may,
in the nb~ence of thr ma~·or nne! clerk from the police station, administer oaths to nfTidavits of rompbints nne! issue warrnnts for
the arrei't of per~ons complnined ngainst.
"2. Section 495 of the Charter of the City of Tampn enacted by
the legislature of the Stntr of Florida in Section 17, Chapter 5303,
Laws of Floridn, 1903, \\·hieh read~ no follows:
"The Chief of Police, or any policrman of the City of Tampa mny
arrest, without w:urnnt, any per,;on 1·iolat ing any of the ordinances
of said city, committed in the presence of such offirer, nne! when
knowledge of thr violntion of any ordinancr of said city shnll come
to snicl chief of poli<'e or policC'mnn, not <'Ommittecl in his presrnce,
he shall at once make affida,·it, before the judge or clerk of the
municipal court, agninst thC' pC'r~on charged with such violntion,
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these clerks qualify as neutral and detached magistrates
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We hold that
they do.
Appellant was arrested for impaired driving on a warrant issued by a clerk of the municipal court. He moved
the court to quash the warrant on the ground that it was
issued by a nonjudicial officer in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 'When the motion was
denied, he initiated proceedings in tho Florida courts by
moans of that State's writ of common law certiorari.
Tho state proceedings culminated in tho holding of the
Florida Supremo Court that "the clerk and deputy clerks
of the municipal court of the city of Tampa are neutral
and detached magistrates ... for tho purpose of issuing
arrest warrants within tho requirements of tho United
States Constitution .... " 250 So. 2cl 4, 5 (1971). We
granted certiorari, 404 U. S. 1014 (1972).
I

A clerk of the munipical court is appointed by the city
clerk from a classified list of civil servants, and assigned
to work in the municipal court. Tho statuto docs not
specify tho qualifications llecessary for this job, but no
law degree or special legal training is required. The
clerk's duties are to receive traffic fines, prepare the
court's dockets and records, fill out commitment papers
whereupon snicl judge or clerk ~hall i~~ue a w:11Tant for the nrre~l of
surh per;;on.
"3. Section 160 of the Charter of the Cit~· of Tampa ennrted by
the lrgislature of the State of Florida in Section 1, Chaplrr 61-2915,
Laws of Florida, 1!)61, which read~ ns follow~:
"The city clrrk of the City of Tampa, with the appro1·al of the
ma~·or, may nppoint onr or morr drpnlit'~, ~urh dq1nly or drputies
to be selrrted from the nppr01wl r!:Jssified list of the city ci1·il ~en·ire,
r1nd to have nne! excrci~e the ~:mw. powers as the city clerk himself,
induding but not limilrcl to the issuance of warrnnts. One or more
of such deputies may br cleoignntccl as clerks of the municipal court."

71-5H5-0 Pl~IOX
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and perform other routine clerical tasks. Apparently he
may issue subpoenas. He may not, ho\\'ever, sit as a
judge, and he may not issue a search \\'arrant or even a
felony or misdemeanor arrest warrant for violations of
state laws. The only 'mrrants he may issue are for the
arrest of those charged with having breached municipal
ordinances of the city of Tampa. 2
Appellant, contending that the Fourth Amendment
requires that warrants be issued by "judicial officers,"
argues that even this limited "·an·ant authority is constitutionally invalid. He reasons that warrant applications of whatever nature cannot be assured the discerning, independent review compelled by the Fourth Amendment "·hen the review is performed by less than a judicial
officer.'1 It is less than clear, however, as to who would
qualify as a "judicial officer" under appellant's theory.
There is some suggestion in appellant's brief that a judicial officer must be a lawyer or the municipal court
judge himself:' A more complete portrayal of appellant's
position would be that the Tampa clerks are disqualified
as judicial officers not merely because they are not lawyers
or judges. but because they lack the institutional independence associated with the judiciary in that they are
members of the civil service, appointed by the city clerk.
"an executive official," and enjoy no statutorily specified
tenure in office."
II
Past decisions of the Court have mentioned rev1ew
by a "j uclicial officer" prior to issuance of a warrant,
Whitley Y. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 564 (1971); Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 356 (Hl67); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482 (1963); Jones v.
"Tr. of Oral Ar~J: ., pp. 6, 7, 20, 21.
1
' Apprllanl's Brirf, p. 6; Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 10.
1 A]lprlbnt's Brief, pp. 12-1B; Hrply Brirf, p. 8.
r. Rrply Brief, Jl. 8; Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 10-12.
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United States, 3G2 U. S. 257, 270 (1960); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). In some cases
the term "judicial officer" appears to have been used
interchangeably with that of "magistrate." Katz Y.
United States, and Johnson v. United States, supra. In
others it was intended simply to underscore the now accepted fact that someone independent of the police and
prosecution must determine probable cause. Jones v..
United States, supra; Wong Sun v. United States, supra.
The very term "judicial officer" implies, of course, some
connection "·ith the judicial branch. But it has never
been held that only a la·wyer or judge could grant a
warrant, regardless of the court system or the type of
warrant involved. In Jones, supra, 270-271, the Court
implied that United States Commissioners, many of
whom were not lawyers or judges, were nonetheless "independent judicial officers." G
The Court frequently has employed the term "magistrate" to denote those who may issue warrants. Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-453 (1971); Whitley v. Warden, supra, at 566; Katz v. United States, supra,
at 356-357; United States\'. F entreca, 380 U. S. 102, 108
(1965); Giondenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486
(1958); Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14; United
States v. Lefhowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464 (1932). Historically a magistrate has been defined broadly as "a public
civil officer, possessing such power, legislative, executive
or judicial, as the govermnent appointing him may ordain," Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1, 7 (1909), or,
in a narrower sense "an inferior judical officer, such as a
justice of the peace." Ibid. More recent definitions
have not much changed.7
Tho United States Commi~sioner sy~tem ha~, of cour.-;e, been
rcplacrd by tho Federal Magi~tratc~ Act of 1961-i, 82 Stat. 1107.
7
Webster's Dictionary, 2d edit·ion, 1957, define:; magi~t.ratc a~
"a person clothed with power as n public civil officer; a public
0
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An examination of the Court's decisions reveals that
the terms "magistrate" and "judicial officer" have been
used interchangeably. Little attempt was made to define
either term, to distinguish the one from the other, or to
advance one as the definitive Fourth Amendment requirement. We find no commandment in either term, however, that all warrant authority must reside exclusively
in a lawyer or judge. Such a requirement would have
been incongruous when even within the federal system
warrants were until recently widely issued by nonlawyers. 8
To attempt to extract further significance from the
above terminology would be both unnecessary and futile.
The substance of the Constitution's warrant requirements
does not turn on the labelling of the issuing party. The
warrant traditionally has represented an independent assurance that a search and arrest will not proceed without
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person or place named in the warrant is involved in the crime. Thus an issuing magistrate
must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached,
and he must be capable of determining whether probable
cause exists for the requested arrest or search. This Court
long has insisted that inferences of probable cause be
drawn by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
civil officer invested with executive or jud,icial power;;, ... " or,
more narrowly, "a magistrate of a class ha,vi.ng summary, oJtea
criminal, jurisdiction, as a ju::;t ice of the pracc, or one of certain
officials having a similar juri~ diction; ... " Hnndom House Dictionar)· (1966) define~ magif:>trate as (1) "a ci,·il oiftcer charged
with the administration of the law" and (2) a minor judicial oJ!icer,
as n ju~tice of the peace, or police just irr, having jurisdict io11 to
try minor criminal cases and to conduct preliminary examinations
of persons charged with serious crimes."
'United Stntes Commissioners were not required to be la\\"y('J"i:i
until pnssagc of the Federal J\l:lgistratcs Act of HJGS. Even under
this Act, a limited cxpcction to lawyer'~ status is afforded part-time
magi~ trate:;. 28 U. S. C. § 631 (b) (1).
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being judged by tho officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v.
United States, supra, at 13--14; Giondenello v. United
States, supra, at 486. In Cool·iclge v. New H wnpshire,
supra, the Court last Term voided a search warrant issued by tho state attorney general "who was actively in
charge of the investigation and later was to be chief
prosecutor at trial." I cl., at 450. lf, on the other hand,
detachment and capacity do conjoin, the magistrate has
satisfied the Fourth Amendment's purpose.

III
The requisite detachment is present in the case at hand.
Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail,
it is clear that it requires severance and disengagement
from activities of law enforcement. There has been no
sho,Ying whatever here of partiality, or affiliation of
these clerks with prosecutors or police. The record shows
no connection with any law enforcement activity or
authority \vhich would distort the independent judgment
tho Fourth Amendment requires. Appellant himself expressly refused to allege anything to that effect.u The
municipal court clerk is assigned not to the police or
prosecutor but to the municipal court judge for whom
he docs much of his ,,,.ork. In this sense, he may well be
tonned a "judicial officer." While a statutorily specified
term of office and appointment by someone other than
"an executive authority" might be desirable, the absence
of such features is hardly disqualifying. Judges themselves take office under differing circumstances. Some
are appointed, but most are elected by legislative bodies
or by the people. Many enjoy but limited terms and are
subject to re-appointment or re-election. Most depend
for their salary level upon the legislative branch. We
"Tr. of Ornl Arg. , p. 10.
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will not vault requirements for the independence of a
municipal clerk to a level higher than prevailing with
respect to many judges. The clerk's neutrality is clear
enough: he is removed from prosecutor or police and
works within the judicial branch subject to the supervision of the municipal court judge.
Appellant likewise has failed to demonstrate that these
clerks lack capacity to determine probable cause. The
clerk's authority extends only to t·he issuance of arrest
warrants for breach of municipal ordinances. vVe presume from the nature of the clerk's position that he
would be able to deduce from the facts on an affidavit
before him whether there >vas probable cause to believe
a citizen guilty of impaired driving, breach of peace,
drunkenness, trespass or the multiple other common offenses covered by a municipal code. There has been
no showing that this is too difficult a task for a. clerk to
accomplish. Our legal system has long entrusted nonlawyers to evaluate more complex and significant factual
data than that in the case at hand. Grand juries daily
determine probable cause prior to rendering indictments,
and trial juries assess whether guilt is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. The significance and responsibility of
these lay judgments betrays any belief that the Tampa
clerks could not determine probable cause for arrest.
We decide today only that clerks of the municipal
court may constitutionally issue the warrants in question. We have not considered whether the actual issuance was based upon an adequate showing of probable cause. Appellant did not submit this question to
the courts below, 237 So. 2d 231 (19-), 250 So. 2d 4
( 1971) , and we will not decide it here initially. The
single question is whether power has been lawfully
vested, not whether it has been exercised constitutionally.
Nor need we determine whether a State may lodge
warrant authority in someone entirely outside the sphere
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of the judicial branch. Many persons may not qualify
as the kind of "public civil officers" "·e have come to
associate with the term "magistrate."
Had the Tampa
clerk been entirely divorced from a judicial position, this
case would have presented different considerations.
Here, however, the clerk is an employee of the judicial
branch of the city of Tampa, disassociated from the role
of law enforcement. We think the independent status
of his position is fully established.
What we do reject today is any per se invalidation of
a state or local warrant system on the ground that the
issuing magistrate is not a lawyer or judge. Communities may have sound reasons for delegating the responsibility of issuing warrants to competent personnel other
than judges or lawyers. 1 0 Many municipal courts face
stiff and uurelenting caseloads,' 1 A judge pressured with
the docket before him may give warrant applications
more brisk and summary treatment than would a clerk.
All this is not to imply that a judge or lawyer would
not normally provide the most desirable review of warrant requests. But our federal system warns of converting desirable practice into constitutional commandment.
It recognizes in plural and diverse state activity 1 ~ one
The Frderal l\1ngistra!r., Act explicitly make~ proYi~ion for
to be appointed in those communities whrrC' membrrs
of the bar arc not nntilable. 28 U.S. C. §631 (b)(1).
11 See generally C. Whitebread ed., Ma~s Production Justice and
thr Conotitutionnl Ic!C'ni ( 1970).
'"States diff<'r significantly in whom they rntru~t :wthorit~· to
grant a warrant. See Burke v. Su]Jerior Courl, 3 Ariz. App. 576,
416 P. 2d 997, 1000 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1966) ; Parks v. Superior Court,
236 P. 2d 874, 882 (Cal. 1951); Kennedy v. Walker, 135 Conn. 262,
63 A. 2d 589, 594 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1948); Crane v. State, 257 A. 2d
768, 773-774 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1969); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 250
So. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1971) ; State \'. Swafford, 250 Ind. 541, 237
N. E. 2d 580, 584 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1968); French v. Ilendricks Sttperior
Court, 252 Ind. 213, 242 N. E. 2d 519, 520 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1969);
10

nonlawyer~
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key to national innova.tiveness and vitality. Harlan,
Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A. B. A. J. 943, 944 ( 1963). States
are entitled to some flexibility and leeway in their desig-·
nation of magistrates, so long as all arc neutral and
detached and capable of the probable cause determination required of them.
WE' affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

Bailey v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan . 600, 191 P. 2d 894, 898 (Sup. Ct. Kan ..
1948); State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So. 2d 192, 194 (Sup. Ct. La.
1965); Wampler v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 231 Md. 639,
191 A. 2d 594, 600 (Ct. App. Md. 1963); Lockapelle v. United Shoe
Machinery Corporation, 318 Mass. 166, 61 N. E. 2d 8, 10 (Sup.
Ct. Mass. 1945); State v. Perlick, 211 l\Iinn. 40, 151 N. W. 2d
591 (Sup. Ct. Md. 1961) ; People v. Richeter, 206 Misc. 304, 133
N. Y. S. 2d 685, 688 (1954); State v. Ji'urmage , 2.50 N. C. 616, 109
8. E. 2d 563, 570 (Sup. Ct. N. C. 1959); Moseley v. W elch, 218
S. C. 242, 62 S. E. 2d 313, 317 (Sup. Ct. S. C. 1950); State v.
Jrff erson, 79 Wa8h. 2d. 345, 485 P. 2d 77, 70 (Sup. Ct. Wa~h. 1971);
State v. Thompson, 151 W. Va . 226, 151 S. E. 2d 870, 873 (Sup.
Ct. App. W. Va. 1966); State v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 540, 137 N. W.
2d 391 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1965); State v. Van B1·ocklin, 194 Wis. 441;
217 N. W. 277 (Sup . Ct. Wi ~ . 1027) .
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The charter of Tampa, Florida authorizes the issuance
of certain arrest warrants by clerks of the Tampa Municipal Court. 1 The sole question in this case is whether
The relevant Floridn. st:1t.utc:'s and Tampa charter provisions
arr as follows:
1. Florid:1 Statute (1967) Section 168.04, F. S. A., which rcadti
as follows:
"The clerk may admini~tcr an oath to and take affidavit of any
person charging anoth!'r with an offense by breaeh of an ordinance,
and may issue a warrant to the marshall to have the accused prrson
arrested and brought before the mayor for trial. The marshall may,
in the ab enre of the mayor and clerk from the police station, administer oaths to affidavits of complaints and issue warrants for
the arrrst of prrsons complained against."
2. Section 495 of the Charter of the City of Tampa enacted by
the legislature of the State of Florida in Srrtion 17, Chapter 5363,
Laws of Florida, 1903, which read~ as follows:
"The Chief of Police, or any policeman of the City of Tampa may
arrest, without warrant, any person violating any of the ordinances
of said city, committed in the presence of such officer, and when
knowledge of the violation of any ordinance of said city shall com(}
to said chief of police or policeman, not committed in his presence,
he shall at once make affidavit, before the judge or clerk of the
municipal court, against the person charged with such violation,
1
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these clerks qualify as neutral and detached magistrates
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We hold that
they do.
Appellant was arrested for impaired driving on a warrant issued by a clerk of the municipal court. He moved
the court to quash the " ·arrant on the ground that it was
issued by a nonjudicial officer in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. ·w hen the motion >vas
denied, he initiated proceedings in the Florida courts by
means of that State's writ of common law certiorari.
The state proceedings culminated in the holding of the
Florida Supreme Court that "the clerk and deputy clerks
of the municipal court of the city of Tantpa are neutral
and detached magistrates ... for the purpose of issuing
arrest "·arran ts within the requirements of the United
States Constitution .... " 250 So. 2d 4, 5 (1971). \Ve
noted proable jmisdiction, 404 U.S. 1014 (1972).
I

A clerk of the munipical court is appointed by the city
clerk from a classified list of civil servants and assigned
to work in the municipal court. The statute does not
specify the qualifications necessary for this job, but no
law degree or special legal training is required. The
clerk's duties are to receive traffic fines, prepare the
court's dockets and records, fill out commitment papers
"·hrreupon ~:1id judge or rlrrk :,;hall i~~11c n warrant for the arrest of
Rll r h per~on."
3. Scrtion H\0 of thr Ch:trtcr of thr Cit~· of Tnmpa enacted by
the legishture of the State of Florida in Srction 1, Chapter Gl-2915,
Laws of Florida , 19Gl, whirh rend~ a~ follows:

...

"The city rlrrk of the Cit~· of Tampa, with thr approval of the
mnyor, ma:v appoint onr or more dqmt irs. surh deputy or deputies
to be selected from the appron•cl cla~~ificd li~t of the rity ri\·il ~rrTirr,
:t11cl to have and rxrrc·i~e thr Rame powrr~ as the cit~· rlrrk himself,
including but not limited to the issuance of w:1rr:mt~. One or more
of such deputies may be designated as clerks of the municipal court."
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and perform other routine clerical tasks. Apparently he
may iRsue subpoenas. He may not, however, sit as a
judge, and he may not issue a search warrant or even a
felony or misdemeanor arrest warrant for violations of
state la,Ys. The only warrants he may issue are for the
arrest of those charged with having breached municipal
ordinances of the city of Tampa. 2
Appellant, contending that the Fourth Amendment
requires that warrants be issued by "judicial officers,"
argues that even this limited warrant authority is constitutionally invalid. He reasons that warrant applications of whatever nature cannot be assured the discerning, independent review compelled by the Fourth Amendment when the review is performed by less than a judicial
officer." It is less than clelir, however, as to who would
qualify as a "j ucl icial officer" under appellant's theory.
There is some suggestion in appellant's brief that a judicial officer must be a lawyer or the municipal court
judge himself." A more complete portrayal of appellant's
position '"oulcl be that the Tampa clerks are disqualified
as judicial officers 11ot merely because they are not lawyers
or judges, but beeause they lack the institutional independence associated "·ith the judiciary in that they are
members of the civil service, appointed by the city clerk,
"an executive official," and enjoy no statutorily specified
tenure in office."
II
Past decisions of the Court have mentioned rev1ew
by a "judicial officer" prior to issuance of a warrant,
Whitl ey v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 564 (1971); Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 356 (1967); Wong Sun v.
United Stales, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482 (1963); Jones v.
"Tr. of Oral Arg ., j)!). 6, 7, 20, 21.
~A ppellant '~ BriPf, p . 6: Tr. of Or:d Ar~. , p. 10.
"Appellanl '~ Brief, Jlp. 12-13; Repl~· Brief, p. 8.
" Reply Brief, p . 8; Tr. of Oml Arg., pp. 10-12.
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United States, 362 U. S. 257. 270 (1960); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). In some cases
the term "judicial officer" appears to have been used
interchangeably with that of "magistrate." Katz v.
United States, and Johnson v. United States, supra. In
others it was intended simply to underscore the now accepted fact that someone independent of the police and
prosecution must determine probable cause. Jones v.
United States, supra; liVong Sun v. United States, supra.
The very term "judicial officer" implies, of course, some
connection with the judicial branch. But it has never
been held that only a lawyer or judge could grant a
warrant, regardless of the court system or the type of
warrant involved. In Jones, supra, 270- 271, the Court
implied that United States Commissioners, many of
whom were not lawyers or judges, were nonetheless "independent judicial officers." 6
The Court frequently has employed the term "magistrate" to denote those who may issue warrants. Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,449- 453 (1971); Whitley v. Warden, supra, at 566; Katz v. United States, supra,
at 356-357; Un·i ted States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108
(1965); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486
(1958); Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14; United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). Historically a magistrate has been defined broadly as "a public
civil officer, possessing such power, legislative, executive
or judicial, as the government appointing him may ordain," Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1, 7 (1909), or,
in a narrower sense "an inferior judical officer, such as a
justice of the peace." Ibid. More recent definitions
have not much changed. 7
G Tho United States Commi~sioner system hn R, of <"OUI'~l', hl'ell
replaced by the Federal Magist rates Act of 1968, 82 Slat. 1107.
{
7
In Compton, a. notary public was deemed a "magistrate," but the
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An examination of the Court's decisions reveals that
the terms "magistrate" and "judicial officer" have been
used interchangeably. Little attempt was made to define·
either term., to distinguish the one from the other, or to
advance one as the definitive Fourth Amendment requirement. We find no commandment in either term, however, that all warrant authority must reside exclusively
in a lawyer or judge. Such a requirement would have
been incongruous when even within the federal system
warrants were until recently widely issued by nonlawyers. 8
To attempt to extract further significance from the
above terminology would be both unnecessary and futile.
The substance of the Constitution's warrant requirements
does not turn on the labelling of the issuing party. The
warrant traditionally has represented an independent assurance that a search and arrest will not proceed without
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person or place named in the warrant is involved in the crime. Thus an issuing magistrate
must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached,
Court has nowhere indicated that the term denotes solely a lawyer
or judge.
1\.ebster's Dictionary, 2d edition, 1957, defines magistrate as
"a person clothed with power as a public civil officer; a public
ciYil offtcer invested with executive or judicial power::;, ... " or,
more narrowly, "a magistrate of a clas::; having smnmar.v, often
nimiual, juri ·diction, as a justice of the peace, or one of certain
olliriab having a similar jurisdiction; ... " Handom House Dictionary (1966) define::; magistrate a::; (1) "a civil officer charged
with the admini::;tration of the law" and (2) "a minor judicial officer,
as a justice of tho peace, or police ju::;ticc, having jurisdiet.ion to
try minor criminal ca~e~ and to conduct preliminary examinations
of persons charged with serious crimes."
"United Statrs Commi~~ioner.; wE're 11ot rcquirrd to be bw~· crs
until passage of the Federal Magistrates Art of 190S. EYE'tt under
this Act, a limited expection to lawyer's status is afforded part-time
magistrates. 28 U. S. C. § 631 (b) (1).

A
~
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and he must he capable of determining whether probable
cause exists for the requested arrest or search. This Court
long has insisted that inferences of probable cause be
drawn by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v.
United States, supra, at 13- 14; Giordenello v. United
States, supra, at 486. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
supra, the Court last Term voided a search warrant issued by the state attorney general "who was actively in
charge of the investigation and later was to be chief
prosecutor at trial." Id., at 450. If, on the other hand,
detachment and capacity clo conjoin, the magistrate has
satisfied the Fourth Amendment's purpose.

III
The requisite detachment is present in the case at hand.
·whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail,
it is clear that it requires severance and disengagement
from activities of law enforcement. There has been no
showing \Yhatever here of partiality, or affiliation of
these clerks with prosecutors or police. The record shows
no connection \Yith any law enforcement activity or
authority which would distort the independent judgment
the Fourth Amendment requires. Appellant himself expressly refused to allege anything to that effect.n The
municipal court clerk is assigned not to the police or
prosecutor but to the municipal court judge for whom
he does much of his work. In this sense, he may well be
termed a "judicial officer." While a statutorily specified
term of office and appointment by someone other than
"an executive authority" might be desirable, the absence
of such features is hardly disqualifying. Judges themselves take office under differing circumstanccs. Some
(I

Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 10.
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are appointed, but many are elected by legislative 'bodies
or by the people. Many enjoy but limited terms and are
subject to re-appointment or re-election. Most depend
for their salary level upon the legislative branch. We
will not vault requirements for the independence of a
municipal clerk to a level higher than prevailing with
respect to many judges. The clerk's neutrality has not (
been impeached: he is removed from prosecutor or police
and works within the judicial branch subject to the supervision of the municipal court judge.
Appellant likewise has failed to demonstrate that these
clerks lack capacity to determine probable cause. The
clerk's authority exteuds only to the issuance of arrest
warrants for breach of municipal ordinances. \Ye presume from the nature of the clerk's position that he
would be able to deduce from the facts on an affidavit
before him \vhether there 'vas probable cause to believe
a citizen guilty of impaired driving, breach of peace,
drunkenness, trespass or the multiple other common offenses covered by a municipal code. There has been
no sho,ring that this is too difficult a task for a clerk to
accomplish. Our legal system has long entrusted nonlawyers to evaluate more complex and significant factual
data than that in the case at hand. Grand juries daily
determine probable cause prior to rendering indictments,
and trial juries assess \Yhether guilt is pwved beyond a
reasonable doubt. The significance and responsibility of
these la.y judgments betrays any belief that the Tan1pa
clerks could not determine probable cause for arrest.
We decide today only that clerks of the municipal
court may constitutionally issue the warrants in question. We have not considered whether the actual issuance was based upon an adequate showing of probable cause. Aguilar v. Texns, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Appellant did not submit this question to the courts below,
237 So. 2d 231 (10-), 250 So. 2d 4 (1071), and we will

l
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not decide it hero initially. The single question is whether·
power has been lawfully vested , not whether it has been
constitutionally exercised.
Nor need \Ve determine whether a State may lodge
warrant authority in someone entirely outside the sphere
of the judicial branch. Many persons may not qualify
as the kind of "public civil officers" we have come to
associate with tho term ''magistrate."
Had the Tampa
clerk been entirely divorced from a judicial position, this
case would have presented different considerations..
Here, however, the clerk is an employee of the judicial
branch of the city of Tampa, disassociated from the role (
of law enforcement. On the record in this case, the independent status of the clerk cannot be questioned.
What we dG reject today is any per se invalidation of
a state or local warrant system on the ground that the
issuing magistrate is not a lawyer or judge. Communities may have sound reasons for delegating the responsibility of issuing warrants to competent personnel other
than judges or lawyers. 10 Many municipal courts face
stiff and unrelenting caseloads. 11 A judge pressured with
the docket before him may give warrant applications
more brisk and summary treatment than would a clerk.
All this is not to imply that a judge or lawyer would
not normally provide the most desirable review of warrant requests. But our federal system warns of converting desirable practice into constitutional commandment.
10 Some communities, such as those in rural or Rpm·~ely settled
areas, may have a shortage of available lawyers and judges an d must
rntrust responsibility for issuing warrants to other qualifird per~ons.
The Federal 1\Iagi~trate~ Act, for example, explicitly m:tkes pro\· i~ion
Ior nonlaywers to be appointed in those communities where members
of the bar arc not available. 28 U.S. C.§ 631 (b) (1).
11
See generally C. Whitebread cd., Mass Production Justice and
tlw Constitutional Ideal (1970).

I
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It recognizes in plural and diverse state activity 12 one
key to national innovativeness and vitality. 13 States
are entitled to some flexibility and leeway in their designation of magistrates, so long as all are neutral and
detached and capable of the probable cause determination required of them.
We affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

'"States differ Rign ificantly iu whom thry rntru~t authority to
grant a warrant. See Burke v. Supe1ior Court, 3 Ariz. App. 576,
416 P. 2d 997, 1000 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1966): Parks v. Superior Court,
236 P. 2d 874, 882 (1st D. C. A. Cal. 1951); Kennedy v. Walker, 135
Conn. 262, 63 A. 2d 589, 594 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1948); Grano v. State,.
257 A. 2d 768, 773-774 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1969); Shadwick v. City of
Tampa, 250 So. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1971); State v. Swafford, 250
Ind. 541, 237 N. E. 2d 580, 584 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1968); French v.
Ilendricks Superior Court, 252 Ind. 213, 242 N. E. 2d 519 (Sup. Ct.
Ind. 1969); Bailey v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 600, 191 P. 2d 894, 898
(Sup. Ct. Kan. Hl48); State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So. 2d 192,
194 (Sup. Ct. La. 1965); Wampler v. JiVarden of Ma~·yland Penitentia,ry, 231 Md. 639, 191 A. 2d 594, 600 (Ct. App. Md. 1963); Lockapelle v. United Shue Machinery Corporation, 318 Mass. 166, 61 N. E.
2d 8, 10 (Sup. Ct. Ma~s. 1945); State v. Perlick, 211 Minn. 40, 151
N. W. 2d 591 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1961); People v. Richter, 206 Misc.
304, 133 N.Y. S. 2d 685, 688 (1954); State v. Funnagc, 250 N . C. 616,
109 S. E. 2d 563, 570 (Sup. Ct. N. C. 1959); Moseley v. Welch, 218
S. C. 242, 62 S. E. 2cl 313, 317 (Sup. Ct. S. C. 1950); State v.
Jefferson, 79 Wa~h. 2d 345, 485 l'. 2d 77, 79 (Sup. Ct. Wa~h. 1971);
State v. Thompson, 151 W. Va. 226, 151 S. E. 2d 870, 873 (Sup.
Ct. App. W.Va. 1966); State v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N. W.
2d 391 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1965); State v. VanBrocklin, 194 Wis. 441;
217 N. W. 277 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1927).
13 Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A. B. A. J. 943, 944 (1963).

